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2Abstract
The diversity of sexual traits favoured by females is enormous and, curiously, it includes
preferences for males with rare or novel phenotypes. We modelled the evolution of a
preference for rarity which yielded two surprising results. First, a Fisherian ‘sexy son’ effect
can boost female preferences to a frequency well above that predicted by mutation-selection
balance, even if there are significant mortality costs for females. Preferences do not reach
fixation, however, as they are subject to frequency-dependent selection: if choosy females are
too common, rare genotypes in one generation become common, and thus unattractive, in the
offspring generation. Nevertheless, even at relatively low frequency, preferences maintain
polymorphism in male traits. The second unexpected result is that the preferences can evolve
to much higher frequencies if choice is hindered such that females cannot always express their
preferences. Our results emphasize the need to consider feedback where preferences
determine the dynamics of male genotypes and vice versa. They also highlight the similarity
between the arbitrariness of behavioural norms in models of social evolution with punishment
(the so-called ‘folk theorem’) and the diversity of sexual traits that can be preferred simply
because deviating from the norm produces unattractive offspring and is, in this sense,
‘punished’.
Key words: female preference, mate choice, Fisher process, ecogenetic feedback,
polymorphism
3Introduction
The evolution of female choice for male traits that signal only breeding value for fitness still
raises challenges for sexual selection theory (Kokko et al. 2006). Mating preferences for these
additive genetic benefits are self-defeating unless countered by other forces: if many females
express the same preference then preferred genes are rapidly driven towards fixation. As
additive genetic variation among males declines, the benefits of choosiness vanish (the lek
paradox: Kirkpatrick & Ryan 1991; Blows et al. 2004; Tomkins et al. 2004), and there is
selection against costly choice (Lande 1981). There are, however, also cases where mate
choice favours genes with non-additive effects on offspring fitness (Jennions & Petrie 1997;
Neff & Pitcher 2005). For example, numerous studies have demonstrated mate choice for
inbreeding avoidance (Amos et al. 2001; Tregenza & Wedell 2002; Lehmann et al. 2007),
others show that choice acts to optimize offspring heterozygosity (e.g. Penn & Potts 1999;
Reusch et al. 2001) and a few indicate that genetically incompatible mates are avoided due to
strong fitness effects associated with deleterious maternal-paternal genetic combinations at
specific loci (Zeh & Zeh 2003). Different females preferring different traits reduces
directional selection on specific male genotypes, and might partly explain the on-going
heritability of sexually selected traits (for a critique see Blows & Hoffmann 2005).
Surprisingly, in a few species females prefer males with rare (or novel) rather than specific
phenotypes (guppies, Poecilia reticulata: Hughes et al. 1999; Eakley & Houde 2004; fruit
flies: Singh & Sisodia 2000). This is potentially a mating preference for genetic benefits that
does not readily fit into the familiar scenario described above. It makes it implausible that
female choice drives preferred genes to fixation even if the preferred genes have an additive
effect on fitness. This is because rare genotypes do not remain rare in the presence of a
preference for rarity. Surprisingly, the evolution of a female preference for rarity has not been
4formally modelled, despite the ‘rare male advantage’ featuring prominently in several
widely-read early reviews of mate choice evolution (e.g. Partridge & Halliday 1984).
For mate choice for additive genetic benefits to evolve both female mating preferences and
male traits have to persist at equilibrium. A key criterion for all models is the maintenance of
genetic variation in male traits (Cameron et al. 2003; Kokko et al. 2006). With a female
preference for rarity the explanation is seemingly straight-forward. Rarer male types have
greater fitness due to their elevated mating success which leads to negative frequency-
dependent selection. Frequency-dependent selection can readily maintain polymorphism in
populations in a wide range of circumstances (Sinervo & Calsbeek 2006). Indeed, it is often
invoked in studies of alternative mating strategies such as female-mimicry in isopods (Shuster
& Wade 1991) and territoriality versus satellite behaviour in lizards (Sinervo & Lively 1996).
At equilibrium, however, the frequency of each mating strategy is such that fitness is
identical. When the male trait that increases fitness is rarity this implies that, all else being
equal, at equilibrium each male type will be equally common. If true, rarity would vanish.
This then begs a question: Can a female preference for rarity persist if rarity does not? The
answer would seem to be no, but brief reflection on Fisher’s original argument for selection
maintaining equal sex allocation reminds us that fluctuations from equal proportions of male
types could suffice to maintain the female preference.
A mating preference for rarity could, of course, be directly beneficial. For example, rare male
phenotypes might be less susceptible to diseases (Lively & Dybdahl 2000) which, if carried,
could be transmitted during mating; or less likely to attract predators that form a search image
for common phenotypes (review: Merilaita 2006; see also Olendorf et al. 2006) increasing
predation risk for females in mating pairs (Pocklington & Dill 1995). There is also good
evidence that rarity can signal non-additive genetic benefits. Guppies live in tropical streams
5and small populations become partially isolated as streams recede into pools in summer.
This elevates the risk of inbreeding which, in turn, reduces fitness (van Oosterhout et al.
2003), but a female preference for rare male phenotypes increases the likelihood of
outbreeding as male coloration is highly heritable due to strong Y-linkage (Brooks & Endler
2001). A rare colour pattern is therefore indicative of a recent, unrelated immigrant (Kelley et
al. 1999). Even if these benefits exist, a preference for rarity, as with any established mating
preference, could subsequently confer additive genetic benefits that might sustain it should the
advantages it originally conferred disappear. For example, what will happen to a preference
for rarity in guppies in larger rivers where inbreeding is unlikely?
Genetic benefits of choice are the outcome of multiple life history traits that can co-vary
positively or negatively (Kokko et al. 2006), and often have sex-specific effects (Fedorka &
Mousseau 2004). By definition the benefit that really matters is that net offspring fitness,
averaged across offspring, is elevated and, as a result, the frequency of preference genes
increases in the next generation. The two composite traits most often considered are offspring
viability and sons’ attractiveness (or, if multiple mating is taken into account, net fertilization
success). Male attractiveness is a special trait in this context because its value depends on the
strength, direction and ubiquity of female preferences. If enhanced male attractiveness is the
only benefit of choice, preference evolution is difficult because the preference has to reach a
threshold frequency in the population before a Fisherian process can “take off” (Kokko et al.
2002).
A moment of introspection suggests, however, that preferences for rare male traits will evolve
in rather unusual ways, whether or not rarity is linked to viability. If rarity confers a viability
benefit to offspring (e.g. because predators lack a search image for uncommon prey; Merilaita
2006) it is conceivable, but not certain, that a preference for rare males will evolve. The
6mating preference could cancel the viability benefit if it causes previously rare (preferred)
phenotypes to become common in the next generation, thus it matters how long rare types
remain rare in the population. Explaining the evolution of a mating preference when rarity
only affects attractiveness is even more challenging (Cameron et al. 2003). The greater
attractiveness females confer to their sons by mating with rare males is again dependent on
how often rare genotypes are preferred (i.e. still rare) in the next generation. Preference genes
should spread if they sufficiently often end up in the bodies of ‘sexy sons’ (the ‘sons effect’
sensu Parker 2006). Whether this will occur in the context of rarity is a non-trivial question,
because rarity is an elusive trait. Rare genotypes are destined to become common if they are
preferred, and any ‘sexiness’ benefit based on rarity is ephemeral. So a key question is
whether preference alleles are still found relatively more often in sexy sons when the
preferred male type keeps changing. Our model will address this question, assuming that
viability benefits of being rare are either absent or present.
The model
Here we use individual-based simulation models to investigate how female mating
preferences for rare male traits evolve. We determine how this process is influenced by the
presence or absence of a relationship between rarity and survival. We then consider the effect
of temporal (and potentially frequency-dependent) variation in male survival prospects.
Finally, we ask what happens when females are less often able to convert mating preferences
into actual mate choice. Our model is loosely based on findings in guppies, in which females
prefer rare or novel male colour patterns (Farr 1977; Hughes et al. 1999; Eakley & Houde
2004) and for whom there is also recent evidence that males with rare colour patterns survive
better, possibly as a result of predator search images for common types (Olendorf et al. 2006).
7The details of our model are provided in the Appendix. Here we simply outline the main
assumptions.
For simplicity we assume a haploid species with a gene with k alleles that determine male
phenotype but is not expressed in females (e.g. male colour morphs). This gene also
potentially influences male viability (e.g. colour affects visibility to predators). There is also a
choice gene such that females either have the preference allele or mate randomly. When k = 1
all males are identical so choosy and randomly mating females mate in an identical fashion.
We use this state to determine the frequency of a costly preference (see below) under
mutation-selection balance.  Subsequently, when k > 1 we use this frequency of the preference
allele as a benchmark: when exceeded it indicates cases where the preference allele is
favoured. In all cases, having a preference carries a cost so that a fraction c of females with
the preference allele die before they can breed.
We begin with a situation where there is no differential viability selection on males, thereby
excluding frequency-dependent predation and similar processes (Nosil 2006) (hereafter ‘no
viability selection’). We then add two kinds of temporally varying viability selection on
males. First, we examine frequency-independent temporal variation in viability selection so
that in each generation we randomly make several genotypes (we use k/2 for simplicity) suffer
an extra mortality risk dI (0 < dI < 1, subscript I denoting independence of frequency);
hereafter ‘frequency-independent viability selection’. This process introduces stochasticity in
a biologically relevant fashion. Second, we examine frequency-dependent viability selection,
where the extra mortality risk dD (subscript D denoting dependency on frequency) only affects
the most common genotype, as has been recently reported from experimental work on male
colouration in guppies (Olendorf et al. 2006).
8We investigate two types of preferences that both involve each female independently
sampling n males from the population to estimate phenotypic frequencies. If there is
unhindered choice, females either mate exclusively with the rarest male type in their sample
(hereafter ‘strict preference for rarity’) or with any male type whose frequency lies below a
threshold in their sample, say 5 or 10% (hereafter ‘threshold preference for rarity’). If two or
more types are equally rare or both lie below the threshold, choice among these males is
random. If no mate type is sufficiently rare then females with a threshold preference mate
randomly. Finally, we consider the effect of female choice being hindered (e.g. due to male
interference or environmental constraints). Females with the preference allele mate with their
preferred male types with probability y, otherwise they mate randomly with probability 1–y. If
y = 1, females always mate with their preferred male type. Each generation there is a non-
directional mutation rate m between preference and random mating. In our simulations we
consider cases with small values of mutation rate m and cost c to increase the realism of the
model.
In each population the preference allele is originally either absent or fixed. Using these two
starting points allows us to determine the influence of initial mate choice after T generations
(T > 2500). If there is none the two population types will converge on a similar outcome.
Each generation N newborn offspring are randomly picked to form the next generation,
thereafter viability selection is applied. We ran 50 replicate populations for each scenario and
recorded the frequency of the preference allele after T generations. Instead of presenting test
statistics, we used a high number of replicates so that the 95% confidence intervals for
evolved frequencies become narrow enough to allow accurate assessment of the changes in
preference frequency arising under different conditions (Colegrave & Ruxton 2003).
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1. SIMPLE MUTATION-SELECTION BALANCE
In an infinite population, a viability cost c that is only expressed in females and an unbiased
mutation rate m between preference and random mating translates to a mutation-selection
balance equilibrium for the preference allele of (Falconer & Mackay 1996):
x = 12
2
c
m
m +
(equation 1)
However, in a finite population the frequency of the preference allele is more often closer to
either 0 or 1 due to drift. This is particularly relevant when x is small, thus the mutation-
selection balance case for the preference allele was analyzed numerically by running a single
population with k = 1 (i.e. no indirect selection on preferences) for 1.5 million generations.
We started with a frequency of 0 and then sampled it every 500 generations. When c = 0.01
the mean is 0.022 (histogram in figure 1). The means from this and similar analyses run with
different values of c generate baseline frequencies against which preference evolution in
various scenarios can be compared (see legend to figure 1).
2. MULTIPLE MALE TYPES
Figure 2 provides an illustrative example of preference evolution in the absence of viability
selection on males. There are two populations, each with five male types, which differ only in
whether the preference allele is initially fixed (figure 2a) or absent (figure 2b). The frequency
of the preference allele stabilises around the same equilibrium value in both populations in
less than 500 generations. When the mating preference reaches even modest frequencies it has
dramatic effects on the relative frequency of male types. The initial random drift (‘red noise’
see Ripa & Lundberg 1996) of male types when the preference is uncommon is replaced by
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tight regulation (figure 2a, when T > 300). Rare male types increase in frequency, common
ones decline and, most importantly, polymorphism is maintained indefinitely. This regulation
is overly strong in populations where the preference is initially fixed, so that the rarest male
type is invariably the most common in the next generation (figure 2b, when T < 100). This
‘spiky’ pattern of changes in the proportion of male types (‘blue noise’ see Ripa & Lundberg
1996) eventually dampens as the preference reaches equilibrium.
The preference frequency can be trusted to have reached values close to the true equilibrium
within T generations, because the 95% confidence intervals for the mean at generation T (T =
2500 or 5000) always overlap between populations where the preference allele was either
initially fixed or absent. This implies convergence such that the true mean is very unlikely to
lie outside the values spanned by the two alternative confidence intervals. As expected based
solely on varying c in equation 1, a costly preference reaches a lower equilibrium frequency
than a cost-free one (compare figure 3a with 3b). The value of the equilibrium frequency is,
however, far more closely associated with frequency-dependent indirect selection than the
position of the mutation-selection balance equilibrium. The mutation-selection balance
(calculated when k = 1) predicts a value of 0.5 for a cost-free preference (no selection) and a
far lower value of 0.022 for a costly preference (c = 0.01, figure 1). In contrast, when indirect
selection affects preference evolution (k ³ 2), equilibrium values are relatively insensitive to
the direct costs of choice, instead they clearly increase with the number of male types (figure
3a-b). This implies that female preferences, when rare, yield indirect benefits that select for
the preference, but when they become ‘too common’, they are selected against both directly
(if there are costs) and indirectly. The fact that the equilibrium values are relatively insensitive
to the direct costs suggests that the latter factor, frequency-dependent indirect selection, can
be strong.
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A strong signature of a frequency-dependent indirect fitness component can also explain
why a preference is selected for at low frequencies and subsequently maintained at an
equilibrium frequency that, in some cases, remains below the value predicted in the absence
of indirect selection (figure 3a: no value reaches the theoretical prediction 0.5). This occurs
when the case with no indirect selection also has no direct selection on the preference (true in
figure 3a because c = 0). The comparison performed is thus one of frequency-dependent
indirect selection versus random drift, which explains the high frequency 0.5 predicted by the
latter. When indirect selection is operating (k ³ 2), the evolutionary dynamics turns from
favouring a preference (low x) to selecting against it (high x) much before the drift frequency
x = 0.5 is reached, thus explaining the low values of equilibria in figure 3a. This finding is
general, however, only in the sense that frequency-dependent indirect selection can produce
equilibria that are either above or below the value predicted in the absence of indirect
selection, not in the sense that indirect selection would always decrease preference
frequencies when considering cost-free cases (see below and figure 4 for counterexamples).
For a costly preference there is no discernible difference between cases where choice involves
a strict preference for the rarest male type sampled, or a rarity threshold (compare figure 3b
with 3c,d), except that the equilibrium frequency is approached more slowly in the latter case
(figure 3b: T = 2500; figure 3c,d: T = 5000). The more male types there are, the more clearly
the estimated true means for preference frequencies exceed the mutation-selection baseline
value of 0.022 (see figure 1). Temporal variation in frequency-independent viability selection
on males boosts female preferences to still higher frequencies (compare figures 3b-d with 3e).
The exception to the rule that preferences evolve to higher frequencies when there are many
male types (figure 3a-e) arises when there is frequency-dependent viability selection that only
acts against the most common male type. This case yields a different outcome, where the
equilibrium frequency of the preference allele is largest with only two male types (figure 3f).
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The equilibrium frequencies with many male types are lower than those in the other
scenarios (compare figure 3f with 3b-e). When only the most common phenotypes suffer a
viability cost in populations with more than two male types, they form a smaller proportion of
the population. Consequently, rare male phenotypes, that more often carry preference alleles,
form a relatively greater proportion of the population, decreasing the skew in mating success.
These findings remained robust when other types of viability correlations were examined, e.g.
viabilities that covary linearly with their relative frequency (not shown).
There is strong frequency-dependent selection on both males (figure 2) and females (figure 3).
The frequency of a costly preference allele approaches a parameter-dependent equilibrium
that clearly deviates from the one predicted by mutation-selection balance (figure 3b-f). The
strength of frequency-dependent selection is also evident in that populations approach the
frequency-dependent equilibrium much faster when female preferences have an effect on
offspring genotypes (k ³ 2) than when they do not (k = 1): repeating calculations in figure 3
with k = 1 (not shown) does not yield convergence by generation T, which is why longer time
spans were used for figure 1. Frequency-dependence means that both randomly mating and
choosy females are selected against when they become too common. As indicated above, the
equilibrium is far more sensitive to this frequency-dependent selection than the null
expectation of the mutation-selection balance. Despite the latter being 0.5 for a cost-free
preference and only 0.022 for a costly one (c = 0.01), the equilibria are very similar in our
examples (compare figure 3a with 3b-f; the same trend emerges for parameter values other
than those used in figure 3).
Finally, if female choice is constrained so that females sometimes fail to express their mating
preferences (i.e. y < 1) then, at least for moderate costly preferences, the equilibrium
frequency is considerably higher than it is when preferences are always expressed (figure 4,
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compare A-D with E). Low values of y, meaning that many females end up mating
randomly despite having preferences, can make preferences reach values close to fixation
(figure 4, cases A-C for c?? 0.001). It is notable, however, that when choice is greatly
hindered (e.g. y = 0.1) it takes far longer for the preference to reach its equilibrium frequency
(figure 4: case A’s have not converged by generation 7500 when c?? 0.001). This is because
selection cannot be strong when most choosy females cannot express preferences, and their
actual mating behaviour is therefore indistinguishable from that of randomly mating females.
Discussion
Our model tracking the evolution of a female preference for rare male phenotypes yields two
main findings. First, when females fully express a costly mating preference for rare males, the
preference will initially spread or decline until halted by frequency-dependent selection.
Although the equilibrium frequencies of female preferences are not high, they are sufficient to
tightly maintain the polymorphism in male traits. Second, if females are usually prevented
from expressing the preference it can evolve to far higher frequencies, and approach fixation.
Neither finding was an immediately obvious and predictable outcome of the model, so we
consider each in turn before reaching some general conclusions.
WHY IS INDIRECT SELECTION ON THE MATING PREFERENCE FREQUENCY-DEPENDENT?
Why are fully expressed mating preferences selected for when uncommon and against when
common? If the preference is overly abundant it causes a rare male phenotype to become the
most common one in the next generation. Choosy females will therefore more often produce
sons with common phenotypes. This transmits preference alleles into evolutionary oblivion
because choosy females’ sons are strongly selected against: they are only accepted as mates
by randomly mating females, who are themselves under-represented. This frequency-
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dependent selection makes it highly unlikely that a mating preference for rarity can ever
reach fixation. On the other hand, if the mating preference is rare, it can spread because of
indirect selection due to the ‘sons effect’ (Parker 2006). Males with rare phenotypes have a
mating advantage that creates indirect benefits for choosy females, as long as choosiness is
not so common that the superior mating success of rare males becomes strong enough to
make their offspring common and thus unattractive. A preference for a trait as exotic as
‘rarity’ can therefore initially spread until it is expressed by a sizeable fraction of the female
population. This explanation highlights the general importance of any feedback loop where
female preferences influence the dynamics of male genotypes and vice versa (Lehmann et al.
2007).
Ultimately, a mating preference for rarity is maintained by negative, indirect frequency-
dependent selection balanced between there being sufficient numbers of choosy females so
that sons with rare phenotypes are sexy, but not so many that rare male phenotypes become
common. At equilibrium all male phenotypes are, on average, equally common. Strictly
speaking, at such an equilibrium females no longer gain indirect benefits by preferring rarer
males, but in a real population this will rarely happen. To understand why mating preferences
are nevertheless maintained, one need only consider Fisher’s analogous argument for equal
investment in the sexes. With equal investment the fitness returns from both sexes are the
same if they are equally costly to produce. In a large population it is then inconsequential
whether a parent produces only sons or only daughters, but as soon as production of one sex
becomes more common, it immediately pays more to produce the other sex. Likewise, any
deviation from precisely equal proportions of each male phenotype — which is likely to occur
in every generation of a finite population — means that some phenotypes will be rarer than
others. Females with a mating preference for rarity then gain the indirect benefit of producing
sexy sons. This indirect selection is typically stronger when there are more male types,
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because the potential rare male mating advantage is greater. For example, if k = 3, the rarest
male type that gains all the matings with choosy females must form less than 33% of the
population; if k = 5 this decreases to less than 20%. In other words, a rare type at less than
20% of the population is “sexier” than a rare type at less than 33% of the population because
fewer males share in matings with the choosy females.
Although in many Fisherian models the sexy son effect arises because the female preference
covaries with a male trait (linkage disequilibrium), the fact that in our case the preferred trait
is not a temporally stable phenotypic trait is not a problem. A consistent definition of the sexy
son effect (Kokko et al. 2006) only requires that there is indirect selection that arises because
of a statistical association of the female preference with attractiveness of her sons. In our
context, this association arises because preferences result in offspring whose genotypes are
sufficiently often rare. As in models of culturally transmitted Fisherian mating advantages
(Ihara et al. 2003, McNamara et al. 2003), the statistical association does not necessarily
equal the linkage disequilibrium of classical Fisherian models (e.g. Lande 1981).
It is noteworthy that, despite incurring costs, mating preferences are maintained well above
the level predicted by the mutation-selection balance. In classic Fisherian models an
additional mortality of 1% for choosy females (c = 0.01), when combined with choice
depleting variation in the preferred male trait, results in the preference being lost (Lande
1981; Pomiankowski et al. 1991). In contrast, when there is a mating preference for rarity,
frequency-dependent selection on males can counter relatively high direct costs of choosiness
because the preferred trait never becomes fixed, which readily maintains choosiness in the
population through indirect benefits when it is rare. Although the proportion of choosy
females was generally fairly low in our models, their mere existence has the major
evolutionary impact of maintaining male trait polymorphism.
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WHY DO COSTLY PREFERENCES PERSIST AT HIGHER FREQUENCIES IF MATE CHOICE IS
HINDERED?
If females are prevented from expressing a mating preference, one might predict that
choosiness will reach a lower equilibrium frequency than it would if fully expressed. The
logic behind this statement is that the benefits of the preferences are reduced while the costs
remain the same (e.g. Lehmann et al. 2007). Somewhat surprisingly, this is not the case when
females have a preference for rarity. Instead, we find the exact opposite: a higher frequency of
costly preferences when females mate with their preferred type less often, even though we
assume that the cost of the preference is expressed regardless of mating outcome. Again this
reflects feedback between the mating behaviour of females and the dynamics of the male
types. The sexy son effect is knocked back every time a rare phenotype becomes common,
and this happens much less often when some females fail to express the preference: it then
takes longer for the rare phenotype to become common.
There are many scenarios in which constraints on female choice seriously hamper the
evolution of preferences (e.g. Greenfield & Rodriguez 2004; Björklund 2006). By creating a
counterexample where an imprecisely expressed preference evolves far more easily than one
which is fully realised, our model emphasizes that the inaccurate expression of preferences
can be a double-edged sword. The expected benefit is obviously diminished if females do not
always successfully mate with their preferred type but, on the other hand, this also maintains
more variation in male traits. Our study shows that it is not trivial to state what the balance of
these two factors lies, as it can vary from case to case.
ARE THERE ANY GENERAL LESSONS TO BE DRAWN?
Our model considered a rather special kind of preference, and it is instructive to compare it to
its counterpoint: preferences for common genotypes rather than rare ones. McLain (2005)
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showed that a preference for common genotypes can spread when commonness is
indicative of current fitness. In McLain’s (2005) model abundance correlates with future
viability but is initially independent of attractiveness. At first glance it is surprising that
preferences for rarity and commonness can both evolve, yet this simply reflects the fact that
‘sexy son’ effects favour whatever trait is currently preferred. The only fundamental
difference between preferences that do or do not confer indirect viability benefits is that the
former evolve more readily (Kokko et al. 2002): they do not require strong pre-existing
female preferences to kickstart self-reinforcing preference evolution. Preferences that only
confer a mating advantage to offspring have to exceed a threshold before they spread
(Pomiankowski et al. 1991), so they are expected to be far less often observed in nature.
There is an interesting parallel to the ‘folk theorem’ (so-named as there is no acknowledged
discoverer) in game theory, whose applicability to studies of social behaviour and the
evolution of punishment has recently been emphasized (Boyd 2006). It states that any
behavioural rule can be stable if individuals evolve to punish those who deviate from the rule.
If we replace ‘behavioural rule’ by ‘male phenotype’, ‘punishment’ by ‘mating preference’,
and ‘being punished’ by ‘giving birth to unsuccessful offspring’ we can recast mate choice as
a situation where males are subject to female-imposed rules as to what phenotypes they
should express. The folk theorem means that an almost infinite variety of pointless rules of
etiquette can arise in human societies if they are suitably policed. Knowing this makes it
easier to appreciate how such an amazing diversity of female preferences has evolved.
The question we are ultimately left with is why some mating preferences, such as ones for
rarity or commonness, as with some cultural rules, arise far less often than others? One
answer is that, as mentioned above, ‘sensible’ preferences that bring about viability benefits
evolve more easily than those that do not. Another is that species extinction rates could partly
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depend on the population-level consequences of adaptive preferences at the level of the
individual (e.g. Kokko & Brooks 2003; Rankin & López-Sepulcre 2005; Dieckmann & Metz
2006; Rankin et al. 2007). For example, in mosquitofish, Gambusia holbrooki, an increase in
the frequency of a rare, melanic male type leads to elevated female mortality and reduced
temporal variation in female numbers (Horth & Travis 2002). A mating preference for rare,
melanic males in this species would therefore have effects on both population density and
stability.
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Appendix
The simulation proceeds as follows.
1. Populations are initiated with a total of N individuals. Individuals have three traits: sex
(male or female), male type (expressed in males only), and female preference (present or
absent, allelic value 1 or 0). Each individual’s sex is determined randomly, and the male type
is drawn from a uniform distribution of integers from 1 to k. Initial populations are
monomorphic for the female preference. It is either fixed or absent. We assume haploid
genetics (for justification see chapter 2 in Kokko 2007).
2. Each female with the preference allele dies with probability c, i.e. dies if assigned a random
number from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 that lies below c.
3. If there is frequency-independent viability selection, each generation k/2 randomly assigned
male types suffer additional mortality of dI, i.e. each male of this type dies with probability dI.
4. If there is frequency-dependent viability selection, the most common male type suffers
additional mortality of dD, i.e. each male of this type dies with probability dD.
5. Each female finds a mate. Females without the preference allele are randomly assigned a
mate, as is each female with the preference allele if a uniformly distributed random number
(between 0 and 1) falls below the value 1–y. The remaining females who are able to express
their preferences each draw an independent sample of n males.  If the simulation run specifies
a strict preference they mate with a male of the type that is rarest in the sample. If the run
specifies a threshold preference they mate with a male whose type frequency is below the
threshold in her sample, but if no mate type is sufficiently rare they mate randomly. In all
cases males are drawn randomly and independently from the population. Mating with one
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female therefore has no effect on a male’s availability to other females, regardless of
whether they do or do not have a preference for rarity.
6. Each female produces four offspring. Although this is a low number compared to that seen
in many organisms, it suffices to describe recruits to the next generation and these are the
evolutionarily interesting descendants. Offspring sex is determined randomly for each
individual. Likewise whether inheritance of the preference and male type is maternal or
paternal is randomly determined for each locus for each offspring. In each offspring,
preference alleles independently mutate to no preference with a small probability m and vice
versa. To avoid any loss of male genotypes from the population due to drift, the mutation
probability m is also used to make male types mutate randomly to any other type (i.e. with
probability m each individual is randomly assigned a new male type between 1 and k).
7. A random sample of N offspring from the total pool is recruited to the next generation.
8. Steps 2-7 are repeated until tmax generations have been completed. The final frequency of
the preference allele is recorded. The entire simulation is run independently 50 times for each
combination of the parameter values of interest.
22
Figure Legends
Fig. 1 Mutation-selection balance histogram of preference frequencies when k = 1, m =
0.0002, and cost c = 0.01, obtained sampling a simulated population every 500
generations for 1.5 million generations. The mean of the distribution is 0.022.
Repeating this procedure for other cost values gives mean values 0.50 (for c = 0),
0.46 (c = 0.0001), and 0.35 (for c = 0.001).
Fig. 2 Example trajectories of the frequencies of the female preference (dots) and male
types (lines) when preferences are initially (a) absent or (b) fixed. The examples
use strict preferences with no temporal variation in viability selection. Parameters
used are N = 1000, n = 50, c = 0.01, k = 5, y = 1, m = 0.0002. The dynamics of
male genotypes are characterized by drift when female preferences are absent, and
much tighter regulation when a fraction of females prefer rare males. Where
preferences are fixed (i.e. up to generation 100 in (b)), the rarest male types are
the most common in the next generation, leading to sharp fluctuations in male
frequencies.
Fig. 3 Evolution of fully expressed (y = 1) female preferences with different numbers of
male types k are in the population. Data are presented as Mean ± S.E. (boxes) and
± 95% confidence interval for the mean (whiskers) for the frequency of the female
preference allele after T generations. The expected frequency under mutation-
selection balance is indicated by a dotted horizontal line (not visible in (a) where
it is 0.5). It was numerically derived (see Fig. 1). Populations started either with
the preference allele absent (open boxes) or fixed (shaded boxes). (a) Strict
preference for rarity with cost c = 0 and no temporal variation in viability; (b)
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Strict preference for rarity with c = 0.01 and no temporal variation in viability;
(c) as for (b) but females have a threshold preference for rarity, mating with any
male whose type frequency in her sample of n is below 5%; (d) as for (c) but the
threshold frequency is 10%; (e) as for (b) but with frequency-independent
viability selection using dI = 0.5, (f) as for (b) but with frequency-dependent
viability selection, dD = 0.5. In all examples, n = 50, N = 1000, m = 0.0002, and T
= 2500 except in (c) and (d) where T = 5000 due to slower convergence between
populations with different initial frequencies.
Fig. 4 The effect of changes in the fraction y of females that fully express their mating
preferences on the frequency of the preference after 7500 generations. The mean
and 95% confidence interval are based on 50 replicates per scenario, and
populations started with the preference allele either absent (open bars) or fixed
(shaded bars). The black horizontal lines give the expected frequency under
mutation-selection balance for a given cost c of the female preference. Cost is
indicated on the x axis. The effect of a greater ability of females to express
preferences can be seen by noting the trend from: (A) y = 0.1, (B) y = 1/3, (C) y =
0.5, (D) y = 2/3 to (E) y = 1. For visual clarity these labels are omitted in the case
where c = 0.01. Other parameter values are: k = 10, n = 50, N = 1000, m = 0.0002.
Short title for page headings: Preferences for rare males
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